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Abstract
Misleading advertisements, such as for ring tones, being a typical example of an unfair commercial 
practice have over the past years caused substantial harm to European consumers and society. 
This is particularly so because in many cases the enforcement response given a legal breach is 
slow or does not happen at all. A discrepancy can be observed between mala fide and bona fide 
traders. While the latter inadvertently breaches the law, rogue traders’ interests lie in the short-
term profit generated by illegal activity. They do not mind changing sectors and try to hide, 
abusing current loopholes in the legal system. The gap between both types of traders is arguably 
increasing and so are the profits of the mala fide traders, not least due to new technologies that 
facilitate their operations; most prominently the Internet.
 This paper deals with the efficient design of enforcement mechanisms addressing misleading 
advertising laws. Enforcement is crucial to induce individuals to law-abiding behaviour. Here, it 
is approached from the deterrence perspective. The UCP directive leaves national legislators with 
considerable discretion regarding the enforcement and the provisions, and institutions involved 
in the countries thus vary and not in all countries the optimal balance might have been struck yet. 
This article’s goal is to add to the knowledge on design requirements for optimal enforcement 
solutions, particularly in terms of players that need to be involved. The two mentioned types of 
traders calculate with differently high benefits. Thus they are to be deterred by different means 
which calls for a differentiated approach in legal responses and institutions involved.
 Path dependency explains why no one-size-fits-all solution is available for all European 
Member States, and the paper aims at providing a set of design requirements that can be adapted 
to the respective legal system.
Keywords: Law enforcement; misleading advertising; deterrence theory; bona and mala fide 
traders; path dependency
1 Introduction
Misleading advertisements, such as for ring tones, being a typical example of an unfair 
commercial practice have over the past years caused substantial harm to European 
consumers, to society. This is particularly so because in many cases the enforcement 
response given a legal breach is slow or does not happen at all. The harm is typically 
trifling for the individual, but widespread.1 A discrepancy can be observed between 
mala fide and bona fide traders. While the latter inadvertently breaches the law, rogue 
traders’ interests lie in the short-term profit generated by illegal activity. They do not 
mind changing sectors and try to hide, abusing current loopholes in the legal system. 
The gap between both types of traders is arguably increasing and so are the profits of 
the mala fide traders, not least due to new technologies that facilitate their operations; 
most prominently the Internet. There is a high potential for keeping one’s anonymity 
when operating via the Internet – it renders it difficult to verify the seat of the traders’ 
business premises.2
* Post-doc researcher at the Private Law Department, Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam, within the 
research program ‘Behavioural Approaches to Contract and Tort’ (www.behaviouralapproaches.eu).
1 In contrast, see F. Weber, ‘Assessing Existing Enforcement Mechanisms in Consumer Law – The 
Unavailability of an Allrounder’, 3 Swedish Journal of European Law (Europarättslig tidskrift) 536 (2011). 
It illustrates the considerations for a high damage case.
2 A recent National Audit Office (NAO) report has identified the costs to consumers, and hence the 
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 This article deals with the efficient design of enforcement mechanism addressing 
misleading advertising laws. Enforcement is crucial to induce individuals to law-
abiding behaviour. The goal is to add to the knowledge on design requirements for 
optimal enforcement solutions, particularly in terms of players that need to be involved. 
The UCP directive leaves national legislators with considerable discretion regarding the 
enforcement and the provisions, and institutions involved in the countries thus vary and 
not in all countries the optimal balance might have been struck yet.3
 In line with the law and economics approach, enforcement shall be discussed 
from the point of view of deterrence theory. According to this theory, the incentives 
of a (potential) wrongdoer to break the law can be eliminated if the sanction for her 
wrongdoing multiplied by the probability of detection and the dependent probabilities 
of apprehension and conviction are at least equal to her benefits from a violation.4 The 
prevention perspective can furthermore add to deterrence.5 The aim of this paper is 
not to advocate perfect, but optimal, enforcement. The cost perspective is considered 
and the level of enforcement that society considers desirable shall be found. Different 
institutions have different sanctions at their availability and their respective powers 
influence the probabilities of detecting a wrong and apprehending and convicting 
someone. Common European definitions of the following enforcement solutions shall 
be discussed: private – via the civil court or Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) – and 
public law enforcement – via an administrative agency or a criminal court, same as self-
regulatory systems. Aside of individual litigation, the costs and benefits of various types 
of group litigation will be assessed. In order to come to conclusions on the enforcement 
mechanisms, the efficiency of substantive law need not be evaluated.
 The two mentioned types of traders calculate with differently high benefits. Thus 
they are to be deterred by different means that calls for a differentiated approach in 
legal responses and institutions involved. Throughout the article, two hypothetical case 
studies – a bona fide and a mala fide trader case scenarios (to be set out) – within 
misleading advertisement shall illustrate what is needed from the enforcement side. 
Path dependency explains why no one-size-fits-all solutions are available in the EU 
and the paper aims at providing a set of design requirements that can be adapted to the 
respective legal system, particularly in terms of players that need to be involved.
 After this introduction, an analytical framework is set out (Section 2) whose 
parameters are applied when assessing the value of different enforcement mechanisms, 
specifically in the case of misleading advertising (Section 3). This application leads to 
design suggestions for optimally mixing the enforcement mechanisms (Section 4). The 
article ends with some conclusions (Section 5).
economy, of sharp practices as £6.6 billion in the UK. At 23 February 2012 the exchange rate was £1 = EUR 
1.19.
 Reasons for CPC regulation facilitating cross-border cooperation in certain consumer law violations: 
Health and Consumer Protection Commissioner David Byrne said: ‘Catching rogue traders is hard enough 
in a single Member State but it becomes almost impossible when they relocate to another country’, Press 
releases RAPID, No hiding place for rogue traders: Commission proposes EU-wide network of national 
watchdogs (22 July 2003) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1067&format
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, accessed 23 February 2012. Cross-border problems 
are growing as rogue traders adapt to new technologies and opportunities. For example, the European 
Advertising Standards Alliance (EASA) estimates that around 63% of the cross-border complaints received 
between 1992 and 2002 concerned rogue or peripheral traders, and this rises to about 86% for direct mail. 
As will be set out this research is restricted to case studies on traders that hide within the countries while 
traders hiding behind country borders are likewise increasingly a problem.
3 See article 10 on enforcement of the Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal 
market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’).
4 See G.S. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach’, 76 Journal of Political Economy 
169 (1968).
5 See S. Shavell, ‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’, 36 Journal of Law and Economics 255 
(1993); T. Friehe and A. Tabbach, ‘Preventive Enforcement’, 35 International Review of Law & Economics 
(2013).
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2 The Framework
In order to evaluate existing enforcement mechanisms and their value in relation to 
misleading advertising, a framework is needed. The analysis follows three stages. The 
first stage of the analysis aims to verify that victims are put into a situation to potentially 
initiate lawsuits, which are desirable from a social welfare point of view.6 The initiation 
of enforcement processes in many instances is dependent on private parties’ actions. In 
order for this to happen, the risk involved in litigation has to be spread in an efficient 
way. In other words, risk allocation has to be optimized.
 Three factors will be assessed at this stage: The first factor is the ‘rational apathy’ 
problem. The rational individual, in some situation, will not sue, as the costs outbalance 
the benefits for her.7 As there is a divergence between the individual and social incentive 
to sue, this might happen despite a lawsuit being in society’s interest.8 The ‘free-riding’ 
problem can occur if, in certain situations in which many victims suffer from a law 
infringement but all gain as soon as one of them sues, it is efficient for everybody to 
wait for someone else to sue and then profit from the result.9 A third factor concerns 
‘funding’ options. The amount of the monetary investment that someone has to make 
when it comes to litigation obviously influences the degree of risks that one feels when 
involving in litigation and the amount of money needed or available – funding – will be 
decisive for the risks that one will bear (this can, for example, be influenced by legal aid 
or insurances).10
 The second stage concerns the incentives. Optimal deterrence induces the efficient 
amount of potential wrongdoers not to violate the law. To achieve this level of deterrence 
any actor involved in the enforcement process (individuals, enforcers – e.g. judges, 
administrators, associations, etc.) has to be induced with incentives to guarantee this 
enforcement process. Here information asymmetries are assessed that have implications 
on the incentives for the behaviour of the better- and worse-informed parties which 
can lead to inefficiencies in that the desirable enforcement level is not achieved. In 
turn, a (potential) wrongdoer is not induced to welfare-enhancing behaviour. This factor 
primarily refers to characteristics of the products, but then also to the characteristics of 
the parties. It can result in low probabilities of detecting legal violations or convicting 
wrongdoers. Capture is another incentive problem, meaning the exertion of influence 
on public administration that leads to public officials pursuing, e.g. industry interests.11 
People’s incentives might be diluted by other personal interests. There are cases in 
which instead of the suing party the defendant turns out to be the victim – the victim of 
a ‘frivolous lawsuit’ that is not based on merits and socially not desirable.12 The reason 
is a misallocation of incentives. Error costs refer to, for example, courts arriving at 
6 The upcoming analysis shall embark from the standard assumption of risk-aversion.
7 See R. Van den Bergh, ‘Should Consumer Protection Law Be Publicly Enforced?’ in W.H. Van Boom 
and M.B.M. Loos (eds.), Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law (2007) 179, at 184.
8 See W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, 4 Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 
33 (1975); H.-B. Schäfer, ‘The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action 
and Legal Actions taken by Associations’, 9 European Journal of Law and Economics 183, at 195 (2000); 
G. Howells and S. Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (2005) at 679, 604; N. Garoupa, ‘Optimal Law 
Enforcement When Victims Are Rational Players’, 2 Economics of Governance 231, at 233 (2001), as to the 
factors that motivate individuals. Please note that this category also fits under the first heading. F. Cafaggi 
and H.–W. Micklitz, New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – The Interplay Between Private and Public 
Enforcement (2009).
9 See R. Van den Bergh and L.T. Visscher, ‘The Preventive Function of Collective Actions for Damages 
in Consumer Law’, 1 Erasmus Law Review 5, at 14 (2008); Landes and Posner, above n. 8, at 29.
10 See W.H. Van Boom, Efficacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort (2006) at 48.
11 See A.I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) at 57. In particular attention has 
to be paid to the life cycles of agencies; C. Hood, H. Rothstein, and R. Baldwin, The Government of Risk: 
Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (2001), at 112; N. Garoupa and F. Gomez-Pomar, ‘Punish Once 
or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties’, Harvard 
Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 308, 
at 5, 17 (2000) also deal with the aspect of collusion as to administrative agencies. See also J.Q. Wilson, 
Bureaucracy – What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (1989), at 433.
12 See A. Renda et al., Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and 
Potential Scenarios (2007), at 562.
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mistaken decisions.13 They can generally be divided in two groups: Error I costs are 
those that occur when an individual who is guilty might mistakenly not be found liable 
(‘mistaken acquittal’).14 Error II costs on the other hand occur if an innocent individual 
is mistakenly found liable (‘mistaken conviction’). Both cases dilute deterrence and 
thus reduce efficiency. A weakness inherent to, for example, the client and lawyer 
relation is that agency problems can occur between them.15 The client (principal) cannot 
fully control the quality of the performance of the lawyer (agent).16 The basis for any 
principal agent problem is an information asymmetry between two parties.17 This can 
lead to issues such as moral hazard.18 The agent basically makes use of the inability 
of the other party to assess the value of the steps she takes and acts according to her 
personal interests. The problem is common to the relationship between the representing 
and the represented party in the enforcement process, and it gets a greater dimension 
if one considers ‘society’ to be the principal of the players in the enforcement process. 
An enforcer, like a lawyer, judge, administrator or self-enforcer, for example, can be 
considered the agent of the society at large which leads to overall costs and benefits of 
their intervention being discussed.
 As the previous points suggest the whole analysis revolves around balancing costs 
and benefits. At the third stage, administrative costs shall be considered as a separate 
category because they can be a substantial social cost. Those costs relate, broadly 
speaking, to costs incurred throughout the enforcement process by the enforcers. 
Emphasis in this article is put on the design suggestions and Section 3; therefore, rather 
than systematically elaborating every step of the framework, it focuses on the key costs 
and benefits identified.19
3 The Quest for Efficient Enforcement Designs in Misleading Advertising
3.1 Preliminary Considerations
In this section, different existing enforcement mechanisms as applied to two hypothetical 
case studies – a bona fide and a mala fide trader case scenarios – shall be assessed 
in a model world based on the European context along the previously explained 
framework.20 Misleading advertising, typically has a small effect on each individual, but 
it is widespread.21 The individual damage incurred in our case scenarios is assumed to 
13 See R.A. Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’, in 
A. Posner and F. Parisi (eds.), The Economic Structure of the Law: The Collected Economic Essays of 
Richard (2000) 290, at 291. [400] He refers to system costs as ‘direct costs’ of operating the legal dispute-
resolution machinery.
14 See A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, ‘The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’, NBER Working Paper 
11780, at 36 (2005).
15 See S. Shavell, ‘The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the 
Legal System’, 16 Journal of Legal Studies 575, at 599 (1997).
16 See S. Shavell, ‘Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship’, 10 Bell Journal 
of Economics, The RAND Corporation 55 (1979); H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999), at 236.
17 See K.-G. Löfgren, T. Persson and J.W. Weibull, ‘Markets with Asymmetric Information: The 
Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz’, 104 Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 195 (2002).
18 See C. Keser and M. Willinger, ‘Experiments on Moral Hazard and Incentives: Reciprocity and 
Surplus-Sharing’, in E. Brousseau and J.-M. Glachant (eds.), The Economics of Contracts Theories and 
Applications (2002) 293. They devote a whole section to the principal agent problem and moral hazard.
19 See for more details and a thorough analysis:  F. Weber, Towards an Optimal Mix of Public and Private 
Enforcement in Consumer Law – A comparative Law and Economics Analysis of European Consumer Law 
Enforcement (Package Travel vs. Misleading Advertising) (PhD Dissertation 2012).
20 The generic term ‘trader’ shall be used. The company and the advertiser shall be assumed the same, and 
no additional questions on liability shall be discussed, as it is not relevant to the general argument.
21 See E.R. Jordan and P.H. Rubin, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising’, 8 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 527, at 530 (1979) ‘no one consumer has an interest to sue’.
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be EUR 15.22 The bona fide trader inadvertently breaks the law (Case scenario 1).23 An 
example of misleading advertising that is illustrative by a mala fide trader (Case scenario 
2) can occur with ringtone advertisement. This has been prominent in the headlines over 
the last few years, and consumers have been misled into concluding a contract instead of 
a one-time download. The profit-maximising mala fide trader calculates her profits up to 
the moment when she will incur a fine, then hides (within the country)24 and/or changes 
the sectors in which she conducts business. She is assumed to primarily operate via the 
Internet. It will be referred to both, situations in which the competitor incurs a damage 
of – let’s say – EUR 100,000 and those where she has no interest in the case.25
 Applying the common core of European procedural law26 the ‘loser-pays’ rule is 
assumed for the model world as to the private law proceedings.27 When it comes to the 
payment of lawyers, contingency fees shall be excluded, as is currently widely the case 
in Europe.28 In terms of group litigation due to the overall strong resistance in Europe 
to class actions, reference shall only be made to representative actions.29 The definitions 
of the mechanisms analysed (civil court, ADR, administrative agency, criminal court, 
self-regulatory systems and group litigation) will be set out at the beginning of the 
respective Subsections 2–6. In terms of available remedies, three main ones are chosen: 
compensation, injunctions and the artificial category ‘fining’.30 The latter would cover 
any remedy going beyond the level of the actual harm to a consumer (such as fines) and 
situations where harm is not exactly measurable and substitute solutions are opted for, 
such as profit disgorgement,31 market disruption fees, cy-pres agreements32 or market 
share liability.33 Any group litigation is assumed to be able to aim at all types of remedies. 
The same is true for individual actions. Unless indicated otherwise, the available courts 
22 Jordan and Rubin, above n. 21, at 529: the role of advertising differs depending on which type of good 
is involved. In relation to experience goods (determine the quality only by purchasing and using the goods), 
advertisers might have an incentive to mislead and make false claims.
23 See M.G. Faure, A.I. Ogus and N.J. Philipsen, ‘Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of 
Regulatory Enforcement’, 31 Law & Policy 161, at 169 (2009).
24 In fact, the trader can also hide abroad and there are various pieces of European legislation available in 
this regard: Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 
2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws (the Regulation on consumer protection cooperation (CPC)), and the European Small Claims 
Procedure, same as the Order for Payment Procedure (Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure). 
Legislation is upcoming, and possibilities to tackle traders that hide behind borders are on the rise.
25 See Jordan and Rubin, above n. 21, at 535: competitors are harmed because sales that they would have 
made have been diverted to the other firm. They can be expected to lose substantially more than consumers.
26 Apart from a thorough study of three countries – the Netherlands, Sweden and England – in the ambit 
of the PhD dissertation, a variety of interviews was carried out with a number of different institutions in 
different MS and large amounts of information were generated in this way.
27 See C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer and M. Tulibacka (eds.), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation – A 
Comparative Perspective (2010), at 28: in almost all jurisdictions the general position is that the loser pays 
the costs of the court, evidence and lawyer (in civil litigation). Some exceptions are possible.
28 Hourly fees are the rule. There is a strong cultural resistance in many states, see Hodges, Vogenauer 
and Tulibacka, above n. 27, at 25. Such arrangements are banned, e.g. in the Netherlands; see for an 
overview on rules in various countries, M.G. Faure, F.J. Fernhout and N.J. Philipsen, Resultaatgerelateerde 
beloningssystemen voor advocaten – Een vergelijkende beschrijving van beloningssystemen voor advocaten 
in een aantal landen van de Europese Unie en Hong Kong (2009).
29 See C. Hodges, ‘Collective Actions’, in P. Cane and H.M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Legal Research (2010) 705, at 707.
30 In line with the deterrence theory, costly sanctions (like fines) can outweigh low probabilities of 
detection and uphold the deterrent effects of a legal response in these cases.
31 In German Gewinnabschöpfungsklagen, to be found in §10 UWG (the German Unfair Competition 
Act).
32 See S. Keske, Group Litigation in European Competition Law: A Law and Economics Perspective 
(2010), at 65. These are used where compensation is not feasible.
33 It means that if a ‘wrongdoer’ cannot be traced, all competitors in the market are held liable to some 
extent. According to E.H. Hondius, ‘Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection – A Dutch 
Perspective’, in F. Cafaggi and H.-W. Micklitz (eds.), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – The 
Interplay Between Private and Public Enforcement (2009) 235, at 248, this idea coming from the United 
States has attracted much attention in Europe, but generally has not been applied by European courts.
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and agencies are theoretically empowered to issue any of the remedies.34 Prima facie all 
cross-uses of facts and findings in one proceeding of the same claimant are possible.
3.2 Before the Civil Court
Enforcement via a civil court is defined as a system where the principle of party 
presentation is prevalent. Litigation can be initiated by individuals themselves (under 
special circumstances), lawyers and representatives. Judges are assumed to be impartial, 
and an appeal system is in place. The role of the state from the outset is restricted to 
‘furnishing the court system’.35
 In terms of assessing its value in the context of misleading advertising as long as the 
advertisement continues to be made public, the harm to society is ongoing, and there 
will be benefits in interrupting the emission of the advertisement or changing it. In an 
individual lawsuit before the civil court, the ‘rational apathy’ is pre-existing with EUR 
15 of damage.36 Even the costs involved for the individual in a small claims case can be 
regarded as too high.37 Particularly because free-riding to injunctions is widespread and 
no individual profit for whoever has already incurred damage is available, the individual 
would be reluctant to bring forward such an action.38 The same is true for any form 
of ‘fining’. If a consumer has suffered only minor harm, any litigation only results in 
further net costs for her. The cost-benefit analysis looks different for competitors if they 
have an interest in the case regarding potential injunctions or remedies from the category 
‘fining’. They profit from any remedy that will harm their competitor’s business or stop 
the considerable harm caused to them. Thus, there are various possibilities to upholding 
a deterring effect.
 Thus, from a rational point of view, the case scenarios at hand would not induce 
an individual consumer to sue but the competitor is an efficient risk-taker. Regarding 
frivolous lawsuits, if a competitor who is well equipped to detect an infringement is 
considerably harmed, she may have an interest in using the law strategically – even 
potentially for cases where she has suffered no harm (thus, frivolous lawsuits).39 In 
particular, this might be the case if she has easy access to remedies from the ‘fining’ 
category. This must be kept in mind when designing legal provisions and procedural 
safeguards. The potential of ‘fining provisions’ to facilitate these kinds of actions 
depends considerably on where and to whom the payment goes. Frivolous lawsuits, for 
example, can be deterred by sanctioning those who bring them forward. Generally in a 
civil court, trivial issues such as a claimant’s lack of information as to the identity and 
location of the wrongdoer can hinder litigation.40 The problem persists if lawyers and 
the civil judges are also unable to generate this information. This can in practice be an 
34 Imprisonment is considered as an additional sanction in the subsection on criminal law enforcement.
35 See Landes and Posner, above n. 8, at 31.
36 Id., at 33; Schäfer, above n. 8, at 195; Howells and Weatherill, above n. 8, at 679, 604; Garoupa, above 
n. 8, at 233 as to the factors that motivate individuals. Cafaggi and Micklitz, above n. 8. According to a 
recent EU study, 5% would take a business to court for EUR 20 or less, 4% for EUR 21-50 and 6% for EUR 
51-100; see European Commission, Special Eurobarometer n 342 Consumer Empowerment (requested 
by Eurostat and DG SANCO 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_empowerment/docs/report_
eurobarometer_342_en.pdf> accessed 23 February 2012, at 218. While this is the average throughout 
Europe, the data has to be looked at from the angle that in some legal systems, such as Spain, consumers 
do not pay court fees. Here the percentage for taking a business to court in case of a damage of EUR 20 or 
less is 9%.
37 This is particularly related to the preparation of such a formal procedure, expressed in contrast to an 
ADR procedure, see interview with Alicia Menéndez González, Spanish ADR board (Madrid 16 November 
2011).
38 Cf. Van den Bergh and Visscher, above n. 9, at 14; Landes and Posner, above n. 8, at 29.
39 Regarding the situation of competitors in antitrust cases, Renda, above n. 12, at 563. It can effectively 
become a medium used to restrict entry to new competitors and create a net loss in social welfare, see 
Jordan and Rubin, above n. 21, at 540.
40 See Van den Bergh, above n. 7, at 180, 201.
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issue as regards the mala fide trader that hides. The competitor might have information 
advantage over a consumer as regards her competitor’s business, and thus suffer less 
from the inability of her lawyer or the civil judge to generate crucial information.41
 The competitor’s intervention could come in handy for the individual consumer, 
as it deters the wrongdoer’s action. In a proceeding, involving a connected damage 
claim, she might use findings from, for instance, an injunctions case, and thus free-ride. 
However, if damage is very small from the consumer’s perspective, not even this effort 
for the connected damage claim might seem justified. On its own, this would lead to 
underdeterrence. While an intervention, as regards the competitor, can be efficient, it is 
not certain, particularly in situations where one industry creates a cartel-like situation in 
one advertising sector, and there would be no deterrence because no competitor would 
intervene.
 Thus, when creating incentives for the consumer side to oppose wide societal harm 
by misleading advertisements, the possibility of ‘group litigation’ comes to mind. The 
applied definition captures any representative action before a court or agency that 
is primarily carried out by an association or a state authority. These representatives 
typically have some advanced possibilities of collecting information.42 Individual 
interests are bundled in the procedure.43 It is essential to note that group litigation can be 
carried out before any enforcement body, and will thus be discussed in every subsection 
as an alternative to individual litigation. It might serve an efficient allocation of risks 
for actions initiated by the consumers’ side. ‘Group litigation’ has a potential to remedy 
an individual’s ‘rational apathy’. This is regarded as a main advantage over individual 
litigation. Free-riding problems can be mitigated. If well-designed, group litigation 
serves as a funding mechanism.44 However, the representative will also weigh carefully 
before which body of law an action is feasible from a financial point of view, which is 
why its rationale for intervention will consequently be outlined regarding the various 
law enforcement bodies involved.
 In the case of an injunction, everybody can profit, independent of whether they 
contributed. For instance, enabling the carrying out of injunctions in this way can 
enhance welfare. However, the deterrent effect of an injunction for a mala fide trader 
is generally low, since the extent of a company’s profits up until the moment of the 
injunctions might lessen deterrence. A speedy proceeding involving interim measures 
to stop the advertisement immediately and for the time during which the procedure is 
ongoing can be crucial, particularly in relation to Case scenario 2 – the mala fide trader 
which counts on a fine in the best case scenario after she has made considerable profits.
 Group litigation has the potential to remedy funding issues for individuals by 
reducing the individual’s financial burden: for instance, when costs are split or taken 
over by a funder. It depends, however, on the individual amount of damage at stake 
if this calculation works. As to direct damage claims, in cases of very small claims 
for damages, where the consumer’s decision is led by the ‘rational apathy’, the option 
41 See Renda, above n. 12, at 77 set this out for antitrust cases; C.B.P. Mahé, ‘De concurrent als 
“handhaver” van consumentenbescherming’, in E. Engelhardt, et al. (ed.), Handhaving van en door het 
privaatrecht (2009) 173, at 174: little or no information asymmetries as they know the market segment.
42 See for the characteristics of an administrative agency (such as powers to monitor, investigate, carry out 
market surveys) also the respective Subsection 4.
43 See for the various forms that group litigation can take: for instance, Keske, above n. 32.
44 Regarding the question of which form of group litigation can more successfully and cheaply be designed 
in an optimal way, there is currently no consensus, although many suggestions for a design have been made 
that remedy certain weaknesses of other enforcement mechanisms. Cf. R. Van den Bergh, ‘Enforcement of 
Consumer Law by Consumer Associations’, in M.G. Faure and F.H. Stephen (eds.), Essays in the Law and 
Economics of Regulation – In Honour of Anthony Ogus (2008) 279, who is critical about optimising group 
litigation involving consumer associations; R. Van den Bergh and S. Keske, ‘Rechtsökonomische Aspekte 
der Sammelklage’, in M. Casper, et al. (ed.), Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Sammelklage? (2009) 17, 
at 40; as to favouring an adequate design of representative actions over class actions instigated by lawyers: 
Van Boom, above n. 10, at 40; Keske, above n. 32, at 246: substantial changes are needed to both collective 
and representative actions. See generally the suggestions for a workable design, in CLEF, G. Howells 
and H.- W. Micklitz (eds.), Guidelines for Consumer Associations on Enforcement and Collective Redress 
(2009), at 14.
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of collective action might also fail.45 It is highly likely that the EUR 15 scenario will 
fall below this threshold. To guarantee deterrence in this type of situation, other ways 
of forcing the company to face a sanction need to be found, even if the individual 
does not directly profit from it. Group actions can aim at various remedies from within 
the ‘fining’ category, and then everyone profits as well. An action for an injunction to 
sideline this action can be imagined. Not only the bringing of the action, depending on 
the body before which it is brought, but also the various remedies, in their preparation 
and realisation, entail varying costs for the representatives. Injunctions are less costly 
to prepare and to litigate than are mass-damage cases.46 ‘Fining’ triggers another set of 
incentives. Although Europe currently still has a severe funding problem in this regard,47 
one possible reason being that contingency fees are in general not accepted, new forms 
of financing processes are developing.48
 A crucial point is the different degrees of information asymmetries. As currently 
structured, a hiding trader cannot be traced in a scenario before a civil court. Case 
scenario 2 involving the mala fide trader will fail prima facie. Investigative powers at 
the civil court are limited. Group litigation can be a partial remedy though, and in cases 
where harm is difficult to detect, for instance, it has a potential to outweigh to some 
extent the missing investigative powers in private law enforcement. The representatives 
might be able to add to locating wrongdoers. While consumer associations are able to 
generate some additional information,49 this is particularly true if it is a public agency 
that will become the representative that has certain investigative powers and can engage 
in monitoring. As regards online trade and advertising, they have tools to track traders 
in hiding by digital investigation. Hence, there is a potential to outweigh information 
asymmetries, and the strengths of this depend on the combination of bodies bringing 
actions and adjudicating actions. The most crucial point from a welfare perspective, 
apart from improving the risk ratio for the individual, is the assessment as to which 
body can generate the desired information for Case scenario 2 in the least costly way, 
up to the limit where society would no longer approve of generating this information. 
The optimal combination of entities could guarantee an efficient ‘information finding’ 
here. Importantly, a public law element would have to be involved in one way or another 
when it comes to mala fide traders. Within a criminal law setting, police involvement 
has a high potential to generate information, whereas less information can be generated 
within a procedure involving a consumer association acting in the civil court, for 
instance.50 Moreover, both, agencies and associations have more detailed knowledge 
about consumer protection laws, and can thus easier identify law infringements.51
45 See R.A. Posner (ed.), Economic Analysis of Law (1998) at 802, 626.
46 This was confirmed in an interview Spanish consumer association Organización de Consumidores y 
Usuarios (OCU) (Madrid16 November 2011) as regards requiring less preparation and accuracy as to the 
exact amount of damage that was suffered.
47 See G.P. Miller, ‘Compensation and Deterrence in Consumer Class Actions in the US and Europe’, 
in F. Cafaggi and H.-W. Micklitz (eds.), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – The Interplay between 
Private and Public Enforcement (2009) 263, at 282.
48 See F. Cafaggi and H.–W. Micklitz, ‘Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection’, 
in F. Cafaggi and H.-W. Micklitz (eds.), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – The Interplay between 
Private and Public Enforcement (2009) 401, at 418. In Austria, a system of pre-financing was developed 
where the Verein für Konsumenteninformation (Association of consumer information – VKI) concludes 
an agreement with a finance company that refinances the costs of the procedure. If the case is successful, 
they retain one-third of the proceeds. This system has certain similarities with contingency fees. Also 
Germany is said to be prepared to also use process insurers. An advantage with several insurers would be 
that they could then compete, see H.–W. Micklitz, ‘Collective Private Enforcement of Consumer Law: the 
Key Questions’, in W.H. Van Boom and M.B.M. Loos (eds.), Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law – 
Securing Compliance in Europe through Private Group Action and Public Authority Intervention (2007) 
13, at 22.
49 A network or resources from membership, for instance. Then again, problems are reported, for example, 
from Germany where consumer associations lack the possibility to generate the information on the profits 
of the company that they would need to generate in line with the skimming off procedures. This was 
discussed at the conference, Borderless consumer protection!? Effective enforcement, powerful consumers 
(Berlin, 7 November 2011).
50 See Van den Bergh, above n. 44, at 284.
51 See Van den Bergh and Visscher, above n. 9, at 17.
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 Capture of associations or public agencies is an issue that leads to severe problems 
regarding principal agent situations, aggravated the greater the number of players are 
involved. This is generally all the more likely, the higher the issues that are at stake. 
While the danger of frivolous lawsuits as to individual consumer cases is regarded 
minor, in group litigation this is a given.52 In this regard, particularly remedies that can 
have an immediate effect need to be carefully designed. The same is true for cases in 
which competitors can profit considerably from potentially frivolous damage to their 
rival’s business.
 In misleading advertising cases, a competitor or a trader association might be a 
candidate to step in, and the rest of the society can free-ride on its efforts. While it is 
costly to design an efficient form of group litigation, the benefits in the category risk 
allocation are very high. Societal benefits might justify this effort. The big advantage 
emerging is that the case is brought at all, and is not left unenforced in cases where the 
competitor does not step in. Furthermore, as regards other administrative costs, it is true 
that they vary with the remedy and with which body is carrying out the information 
search. Group litigation entails fewer costs per individual, but the procedure as such is 
more costly. The question is whether one wants to set these total administrative costs in 
relation to the situation in which all cases have been brought in an individual proceeding, 
or exclude the number of cases that might not have been brought because the individual 
cost-benefit analysis would not justify it.
 While Case scenario 1 can be dealt with, for example, consumer associations as a 
representative at the civil court, in Case scenario 2, investigative powers of some kind 
would be needed. Pure private law enforcement will fail, but it could be outweighed by 
another entity involved as a representative, for instance, to generate this information.
3.3 ADR
‘ADR’ refers to adjudication by a body, unrelated to a publicly financed court, where 
the procedure is considerably less formalised. Typically, industry and the state are 
responsible for the financing of the institution. The body is composed of consumer 
and business representatives. The involvement of a legal representative is generally 
not required, and the awards are prima facie of a lower value in terms of enforceability. 
Systems to strengthen these awards are imaginable.53 Another typical characteristic is 
that the procedure involves little costs for the consumer if she acts as a claimant. The 
ADR body is limited in remedies, and allows only actions for damages.
 It derives from the foregoing that the smaller the individually suffered harm, the 
lower the procedural costs for the individual consumer actually have to be in order to 
induce her to take up the investment in litigation. The ADR body can capture low-value 
claims to some degree, more than the civil court, but from a rational point of view, 
even for the ADR body, damage in some cases might be too small to make a claim. 
Procedural rules reflect this in claims below certain thresholds not being admitted. This 
is likely to be the case for EUR 15. While a consumer’s action before this body is thus 
very unlikely in the case scenarios discussed, a competitor might bring a case if she 
was granted standing. A procedure can be set in relation to findings of unlawfulness, for 
instance, by way of an injunction by a public entity, which might reduce the costs of the 
individual case for the claimant but also for society. Wrongdoers that cannot be tracked 
down cannot be complained against. In this sense the situation is comparable to the 
civil court. In general, the voluntary element on the trader’s side is crucial. In various 
countries, the will to participate in the system is ensured by the trader being registered 
52 A formal model on incentives for frivolous suits was developed by D. Rosenberg and S. Shavell, ‘A 
Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value’, 5 International Review of Law and Economics, 
(1985) 3. For Europe see Schäfer, above n. 8.
53 A prime example is the system of ‘underlying business guarantees’ available in the Netherlands: see 
F. Weber and C. Hodges, ‘Netherlands’, in C. Hodges, I. Benöhr, and N. Creutzfeldt-Banda (eds.), Consumer 
ADR in Europe (2012) 129, at 160. See for instance, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, article 6.
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with the body.54 In a way, only clear-cut cases are dealt with, and against a pre-defined 
set of defendants – those that volunteer to it. This distinguishes its value for case of 
bona and mala fide traders generally.55 Depending on whether systems to strengthen the 
ADR awards are available or not in the event of resistance on the part of the wrongdoer, 
the ADR procedure might only be the first step, and an ordinary proceeding has to be 
initiated in any case.
 As to group litigation, the analysis can be kept short: firstly an ADR body has basically 
no investigative powers. And as stated, representatives have a potential to outweigh 
this lack of power to generate information that the individual or this body’s enforcer 
cannot. Depending on who the representative is – namely, rather a public agency than 
a consumer association – the missing investigative powers can be compensated for in 
Case scenario 2. As to group litigation, capture is regarded as a big issue in terms of the 
various representatives: that is, associations56 or public agencies. Likewise, it is serious as 
regards employees of the ADR body. Thus, in the main, there are many players involved 
about whom it can be assumed that they would pursue their own interests rather than 
the ones they should be focused on; hence, results become very uncertain. This situation 
speaks in favour of involving a court element – an independent decision-maker with 
a strict procedural law. Frivolous lawsuits can be an issue here when group litigation 
is allowed, and is a further argument in favour of introducing procedural safeguards. 
Indeed, error costs are intuitively more likely with an ADR body than in a court,57 and 
they would potentially be spread across all members of the group if mass cases were 
decided. Due to error costs, this would increase the social costs. These arguments speak 
in favour of disabling mass cases involving an ADR body. The last argument against 
allowing mass cases that involve an ADR body is the lack of a further development of 
case law which is a general effect if decisions are taken outside of the courts. A mass 
issue might indeed be a case where clarifications on the law are desirable.
 Thus, overall there seems to be no role really for the ADR body in the case scenarios. 
A competitor – if granted standing – might make use of it. The assumed competitor’s 
damage is, however, high enough, to also induce her to take up action before a different 
kind of body with a more costly procedure.
3.4 Administrative Agency
‘Administrative enforcement’ shall be defined as being performed by an agency that can 
carry out monitoring and has some investigative powers.58 It can decide by itself, refer 
cases to a court, or even defend them in a court. Actions can be triggered by low-cost 
reporting or carried out on its own motion. Compensation can generally not be granted. 
Appeal along the lines of the administrative law branch is possible.59
 The efficient handling of both scenarios might be found in public law enforcement: 
As the state takes over a large share of the risk by providing for the majority of costs of 
the procedure – and by giving the lead for the procedure to the agency – the notion of 
who triggers a procedure is less decisive than under private law enforcement; hence, the 
role of lawsuit initiator is diminished. A public agency has the advantage of providing 
for high investigative powers (including digital investigations). In other words, after 
a ‘low-cost’ report or on an own motion, the public entity steps in as a remedy: for 
instance, the ‘rational apathy’ if the individual’s damage is not more than EUR 15.
54 In Spain, ADR could take place involving non-registered ones but she needs to agree, article 24(4) Real 
Decreto 231/2008, de 15 de febrero, por el que se regula el Sistema Arbitral de Consumo (Royal Decree 
that establishes the consumer arbitration system).
55 While in the case scenarios at hand the value of EUR 15 seems to exclude the value of an ADR body 
in cases of considerable damage for individual consumers it is clearly given as illustrated in Weber, above 
n. 1.
56 See Van den Bergh,  above n. 44, at 294; Schäfer, above n. 8, at 199.
57 This could be mitigated by experts being involved in taking the decisions at the ADR body.
58 Note that in practice, investigative powers given to public authorities vary between countries and 
between legal fields within these countries. Therefore, a potential in investigative powers generally is given.
59 Similarly characterised in F. Cafaggi and H.-W. Micklitz, ‘Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in 
Consumer Protection: The Way Forward’, EUI Working Papers LAW (2008/29), at 4.
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 If societal harm is extensive, with harm being less serious to the individual but 
widespread, it must be guaranteed that the authority obtains the information to take 
enforcement action. If private information – in the hands of individual consumers or 
competitors – needs to be transmitted, incentives have to be provided in order for this 
to be granted.60 Remedies can play a crucial role in this regard. Not being able to obtain 
compensation might be a disincentive for consumers. Having suffered only minor harm, 
the consumer might not be inclined to take any further action at all. Reporting strategies 
can be envisaged: for instance, cooperation with consumer advice centres and so on, 
where consumers have complained. Taking over the costs from the individual might be 
justified in this setting, because each individual has experienced only a minor damage 
for which she would not be willing to finance an entire procedure.
 The entity’s available investigative powers can then come in handy, particularly for 
Case scenario 2. As regards generating information, it must always be kept in mind how 
costly it would be for the individual to obtain this information.61 This factor, then again, 
has to be set in relation to the societal harm. Monitoring and own investigations can lead 
to the agency becoming aware of infringements, which puts them in the position to take 
action on an own motion. The speed of a reaction will be another factor in the efficiency. 
Thus, monitoring or ex ante clearing might be an effective tool, particularly to protect 
bona fide traders and to single out mala fide traders; however, it is very costly in terms 
of administrative costs and leads to a danger of societal losses due to censorship.
 The distinction between individual and group cases becomes blurred in relation to a 
public authority, since it will ultimately decide whether a case is to be taken regardless 
of who triggers it. When purely assessing group litigation – for instance, a representative 
bringing a case to the authority – the individual is relieved of the reporting activity but 
must show her affiliation with the group litigation. In terms of the agency acting as 
a representative, certain findings as to a public agency coming before a civil court, 
for instance, have already been discussed in Subsection 2. If representative actions are 
brought to a public authority, advantages in risk-sharing that are given to the individual 
are present also for the representative. The interaction here is that monitoring or 
investigation could be carried out either by the representative or by the public body. 
The fact that the public body can generate a great deal of information is a new aspect 
compared with the private law branch, and it might be decisive for the CBA of the body 
carrying out a lawsuit. From the perspective of the association, it could be advantageous 
that there are enhanced investigative powers in comparison to a civil court (and certainly 
an ADR) and reduce their costs. This can be a decisive issue when assessing risks of a 
proceeding, and might induce the representative body to favour a public body. In this 
sense, the procedure is superior in terms of generating more information if it includes 
a public authority, which is necessary for scenarios like Case scenario 2. The drawback 
might be the lack of compensation as a remedy.
 Capture is possible of the agency bringing the case or deciding a case, and within 
associations. The more powers that are in the hands of the same entity, the greater the 
danger: for example, bringing a case, and then investigating and adjudicating it, which 
is the situation if everything is being handled by the same body. A separation – or 
different, separate units within the entity decide – can be considered here, or rules that 
public bodies can bring actions, for instance, only to the civil court, to an ADR body, 
or to specialised courts. Other reasons underlying this are the costs of spreading error 
cost across all members of the group, or the occurrence of frivolous lawsuits. Likewise, 
60 See W.H. Van Boom and M.B.M. Loos, ‘Effective Enforcement of Consumer Law in Europe: 
Synchronizing Private, Public, and Collective Mechanisms’, Working Paper Series (2008), at 16; In 
competition law: leniency programs are for instance regarded as providing private information within 
public law enforcement structures Keske, above n. 32, at 20; Shavell, above n. 5, at 259, 267. See on self-
reporting: L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior’, 102 
The Journal of Political Economy 583 (1994).
61 It is not excluded that future technological developments will render it indeed worthwhile to equip 
individuals or their lawyers with wider investigative powers. Low administrative (and other societal) costs 
might justify this at some point. For the time being, societal costs are assumed not to outweigh the benefits 
of equipping every individual with wide investigative powers.
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these are arguments in favour of introducing a court element into the procedure. This 
parallels developments that have taken place in criminal law regarding the role of the 
public prosecution.
 Administrative costs depend on the remedy involved, and on whether it concerns 
individual or group litigation. The number of administrative bodies to be set up to 
reduce the risk of capture is also decisive here, together with the extent to which they 
are empowered to make use of their investigative powers for the optimal number of 
cases. Lower administrative costs would depend on whether information raised could 
be transferred without doubling.
 In total, and in particular for Case scenario 2, the investigative powers are crucial. 
For Case scenario 1, they might not be necessary. Issues of capture, frivolous lawsuits 
and error costs speak in favour of involving a court element in the procedure. Public 
authorities are also privileged compared with pure private litigation when it comes to 
investigating facts about a case (e.g. powers to access business premises).
 Competitors can have high damages at stake and thus incentives to sue in the 
civil court. Due to them being from within the market, it is less likely that they need 
additional investigative powers.62 It is certainly beneficial to motivate representatives 
to seek remedies like injunctions, where individuals would not take this step but where 
societal harm is extensive.
3.5 Criminal Court
The public prosecutor is central to the functioning of the criminal process.63 Once an 
investigation is initiated, for instance because a crime has been reported, the matter 
is investigated with the help of the police. There can be a role to play for judges to 
authorise the use of certain investigative powers, and the judgment is given by a 
criminal court where the prosecution brings the case as the plaintiff. A wide variety of 
sanctions exist, judges are supposedly impartial and an elaborate appeal system is in 
place. The procedure entails very little administrative costs for the individual who only 
reported the crime. Lawyers are involved on the part of the defendant, and, if guilty, 
the defendant generally has to pay the costs of the whole process. There is generally 
a way for the victim to join the procedure and to sue for damages, which can involve 
lawyers. A special sanction on top of the ones generally available in law enforcement is 
imprisonment.
 Using criminal law in these case scenarios would guarantee, in particular for Case 
scenario 2, that wide investigative powers could be made use of (tracking down individuals 
is a typical feature of this type of legal branch), irrespective of the representative 
involved (individual or others). The criminal procedure has the potential to outweigh 
any lack of investigative powers present with the players (as to the nature of the trader 
as crucial in Case scenario 2 or other characteristics of the case). Where the threat to 
pay compensation is not credible or not sufficiently, an important advantage of criminal 
law enforcement is that there are other costly sanctions available to uphold the deterrent 
effect of legal responses. The costly sanctions outweigh low probabilities of detection or 
conviction as present in Case scenario 2. Then again, the available investigative powers 
also increase the probability of being detected and convicted. The issue with regard 
to a judgment-proof defendant can also be resolved by the different sanctions that are 
available – the prime example of a non-monetary sanction being imprisonment.64 It 
is imaginable that cases that could not be tried because of missing information as to 
necessities to start a lawsuit at all can be tried under this branch of law, because there 
62 Here little or no information asymmetries are present as they know the market segment Mahé, above 
n. 41, at 174.
63 See J. Hodgson and A. Roberts, ‘Criminal Process and Prosecution’, in P. Cane and H. M. Kritzer (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (2010) 64, at 80: provide an overview of empirical 
work carried out as to their role, in particular, as to their independence.
64 Cf. R. Bowles, M.G. Faure and N. Garoupa, ‘The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An 
Economic View and Policy Implications’, 35 Journal of Law and Society 389, at 402 (2008).
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are possibilities of gathering information prior to the trial – for example, regarding the 
location of the trader. This represents the highest likelihood of Case scenario 2 being 
dealt with successfully.
 Courts are arguably less susceptible to capture, but prosecutors might be. The 
occurrence of error costs can be resolved to a certain extent by the accuracy of criminal 
procedural law, which, in turn, leads to high administrative costs.65 Criminal law leaves 
little scope for frivolous lawsuits. It is evident that, for a representative body as well, 
preparing litigation here could be very costly: for instance, satisfying the high burden of 
proof.66 An existing variant of this are some public agencies that can act as prosecutor 
(with possible police involvement).67 In other instances then, the procedure will be 
carried out by the public prosecutor, and the role of individuals or associations in this 
case seems to be limited, and thus their costs as well. This again guarantees police 
involvement, and, likewise, criminal courts can order the police to act. It is obvious that 
for Case scenario 2, the use of criminal law can be warranted for certain types of traders. 
The procedure could be used as an underlying threat to enable exploiting less costly 
mechanisms and provide for non-monetary sanctions where necessary.
 Should an error ever occur in a collective criminal proceeding, costs on the side of 
the mistakenly convicted would be very high (pay for all), as would costs for the victims 
if someone wrongfully walked free (no money for anyone and potentially a repeat 
offence). A high degree of accuracy, typically attributed to criminal law procedures, can 
be of considerable value in mass cases, as they reduce the occurrence of error costs.
 Criminal law is intended mainly to be a fallback option – an underlying threat – for 
consumer law cases such as the ones at hand.
3.6 Self-regulation
Self-regulation here shall be considered in the narrow sense, namely, as limited regulatory 
powers over a certain industry. The self-regulation system is financed entirely by the 
industry. Complaints can be brought, generally free of charge, in the event of breaches 
of the code. This procedure does not reflect an equal representation of consumers and 
traders, and damages are not usually granted. All other remedies are likewise excluded 
by this self-regulatory body, even though in fact the result of the described process is 
similar to an injunction. Such type of bodies typically offers some ex ante advice.
 Again, the ‘rational apathy’ can be an issue in reporting, and individuals (consumers, 
traders) or representatives need to be motivated to act. Costs are borne by the market in 
which the self-regulation is applied.68 In contrast to public regulation, one advantage lies 
in the fact that self-regulatory authorities have better information about the market to be 
controlled, which includes tracing wrongdoers.69 Registration with the self-regulatory 
65 See G.S. Becker and G.J. Stigler, ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’, 
3 Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 3 (1974): Becker argues that with an ‘increasingly thorough and expensive 
investigation, one can determine with increasing precision the probable behavior of a given person’.
66 See Interview with Gunnar Larsson, Swedish Consumer Ombudsman and Head of Consumer Authority 
(Stockholm, 25 August 2009) who expressed this for the Swedish legal system.
67 The Swedish Consumer Ombudsman can act as a prosecutor in certain scenarios. In England the 
use of criminal prosecution is an important part of enforcement of the public regulators. In their formal 
enforcement role officers are required to operate to the same rules and standards as police officers and 
have to comply with the provisions of the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Criminal Procedure & 
Investigations Act 1996 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
68 Cf. J.C. Miller, ‘The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of Self-Regulation’, 
4 Cato Journal 897, at 898 (1985). Industry bears the costs of self-regulation: I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992), at 114; Ogus, above n. 11, at 107. 
Also are traders said to have an interest that brings about regulation that improves the working of the 
economic system, see R.H. Coase, ‘Advertising and Free Speech’, 6 Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 6 (1977), 
but it has to be looked at with suspicion.
69 Cf. Van den Bergh, above n. 7, at 203, 202; Miller, above n. 68, at 897.
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body via the sector association is typically comparable to registration with the ADR 
body in other sectors. Some traders, intuitively particularly Case scenario 2 traders, will 
not participate in this type of system.70
 The advantage in terms of information has to be contrasted with the risk of capture, 
which is by definition given with self-regulation. There are other potential benefits with 
self-regulation: for instance, it does not pose a problem under the agency issue, as no 
representative is needed.
 Despite being limited in scope, the regulating body can create considerable benefits 
for case scenarios where traders are compliant. As in Case scenario 2, in the case of a 
trader who is not willing to comply and is potentially reluctant to become a member of 
the sector organisation, this enforcement mechanism will be unable to force the trader 
to comply with its decision. However, Case scenario 1 could be dealt with successfully 
here. Another advantage in particular for the Case scenario 1 type of trader can be seen 
in the possibilities of ex ante advice. Pre-clearance possibilities before an advertisement 
is made public at all can be examined by a trader: for instance, on a voluntary basis. 
The voluntary aspect can lead to signalling as to which trader represents which type, 
and would allow for some targeted monitoring: for example, in cooperation with other 
enforcers. Furthermore, efficiency might speak in favour of setting up ways according 
to which findings by this body can be used as indications in other judicial proceedings: 
for example, damage cases, at least those brought by competitors.
 While generally one single complaint is sufficient, collective actions can contribute 
in the event that an exertion of pressure is needed. It can be desirable where individuals 
feel disinclined to complain due to low damages and to having little interest in 
preventing the trader from acting in the future. In some cases, the competitor might also 
have no monetary interest in intervening: for instance, as soon as a sector is organised 
in a cartel-like fashion. For a representative’s CBA as well, the low procedural costs 
will encourage them to actually complain before travelling along more costly routes. 
An intervention by a body as representative with investigative powers can enhance 
efficiency by generating more comprehensive information within the system. As stated 
previously, self-regulators generally have considerable information about the own 
sector and its participants. Depending upon who brings the case, there might be issues 
as to various entities that can be captured and agency issues. As already mentioned, the 
underlying threat of other enforcement systems is crucial.
 From an administrative costs point of view, self-regulation costs are regarded as low 
compared with, for instance, public enforcement.71 Because no damages are granted, 
administrative costs are presumably even lower than those involving an ADR body. 
However, the prevention of other societal costs has to be assured in the self-regulatory 
body’s design. Then again, if a pre-clearance system is in place, its financing must be 
envisaged. Nevertheless, the way this mechanism can be used in this case scenario is not 
in the way of assessing damage, deciding on injunctions, or fining, but is a preliminary 
step to changing a misleading advertisement. Thus, while it might often be only a first 
step, the lower administrative costs could justify implementing this mechanism for the 
few cases that double. The exact extent of the administrative costs depends on what the 
self-regulatory entity precisely looks like, and in how far it is coordinated with other 
entities in the enforcement mix. Similar to an ADR body, it does not provide a solution 
for every case, and it cannot exist as the only enforcement mechanism. It is dependent 
on a ‘stick’. Efficiency considerations might support that within the mechanism the 
funding is distributed to these tasks, and that self-regulatory bodies do not engage in 
preparing collective actions. Some monitoring effort might be imaginable, however, but 
only as regards the code of conduct.
70 See F. Alleweldt et al. (Civic Consulting on behalf of IMCO), State of Play of the Implementation of the 
Provisions on Advertising in the Unfair Commercial Practices Legislation (2010), at 22.
71 See Faure, Ogus and Philipsen, above n. 23‚ at 171. If such a system is able to achieve compliance, it 
will typically do so at a significantly lower administrative cost than if public enforcement processes are 
invoked.’
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 The value of self-regulation is given in being a potential low-cost cross-financer for 
more costly procedures and in providing for some ex ante action. The results of the self-
regulatory body have to be monitored carefully with regard to pursuing social welfare 
interests, as it is self-evident that it is more inclined to pursue industry’s interests.
4 Design Suggestions
In terms of design suggestions, a first set of considerations revolves around making 
use of the role of the competitor and her incentives concerning the development of 
a competitor’s business. When it comes to a competitor who has suffered substantial 
individual damages, her interests at stake are assumed to be high, and her business 
can profit from remedies such as injunctions or from the ‘fining’ category. Apart from 
the civil court, B2B arbitration options might also be available in a particular country. 
Notably, in relation to a trader, a competitor generally suffers from a lower information 
asymmetry than does a consumer.72 Therefore, in terms of optimising responses in 
more cases, it is useful if she presents the evidence without the intervention of a costly 
investigation. The cases are to be channelled to private law bodies rather than to a 
public authority or the criminal court, unless in exceptional circumstances where the 
information asymmetry is high. The potential interest in damaging the competitor’s 
business frivolously has to be considered. While the competitor’s intervention can be 
beneficial for social welfare, she might not have an incentive to sue in every situation 
in which it would be desirable from a social point of view: for instance, the ‘cartel 
situation’.
 When it comes to trifling but widespread harm, a crucial first consideration when 
talking about optimal mixes is that there will be cases where it is no longer worthwhile 
from an economic point of view to calculate and distribute compensation for a group 
of individuals. In order to prevent a loss of the deterrent effect, other possible remedies 
are included in this assessment. Injunction or remedies in the ‘fining’ category are other 
forms that the sanction can take and that can deter the wrongdoer. It is essential to realise 
that mala fide traders count on the fact that the individual will not sue due to the minor 
harm suffered, and that the challenge thus is to design an optimal response involving 
various types of remedies and players. Hence, to uphold the deterrent effect, in addition 
to alternative remedies, alternative initiators of an action also need to be discussed – 
notably, forms of grouping claims. This is particularly crucial in situations where no 
free-riding on the competitor’s efforts is possible because she has no incentive to sue. 
The initiation of lawsuits via other players, like consumers or their representatives, must 
be guaranteed.
 The conclusion regarding an optimal design can centre on certain main questions. It 
can be discussed which bodies should play a role in the mix, considering in particular 
the need to generate information and the danger of diluted incentives: for example, by 
capture or principal agent problems. On the basis of the previous analysis, there are 
good reasons why in the possible interactions a public law element for the investigation 
is necessary for preparing an enforcement system for type 2 case scenarios. The way in 
which this information enters the enforcement response is less decisive. Solutions can 
involve any strategy that makes use of the threat of a sanction by a public authority, 
and that induces traders to find a solution regarding the consumer; likewise, it can be a 
deal resulting from informal negotiations: for instance, in which the trader commits to 
compensating the consumers. By the same token, enabling follow-on damage claims 
might be efficient as long as it does not lead to over-deterrence.73 Rather than severely 
restructuring existing bodies (e.g. to enable them to grant remedies they normally do 
not), coordinating them more closely is desirable. Restructuring might, for instance, 
have an impact on the involvement of lawyers, procedural costs, and appeal structures 
72 See Mahé, above n. 41, at 174.
73 In reality, this type of coordination does not exist as a general policy in Europe; see F. Cafaggi, ‘The 
Great Transformation. Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: A Remedial 
Perspective’, 21 Loyola Consumer Law Review 496, at 519 (2009). The experimental character of this 
article justifies exploring these possibilities.
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on the part of the public authority, and thus reduce its positive effects, in particular on 
the cost-benefit analysis of the individual (a given if the state takes over a large part 
of the litigation costs). There is also no danger of a spill-over of weaknesses when 
restructuring enforcement bodies if it is abstained from doing so.
 Only for type 1 case scenarios can a response without a public authority be effective: 
for instance, by relying purely on a consumer association acting before a civil court. It 
can also be considered that associations engage in monitoring for certain types of case 
scenarios. A consumer association is assumed to have less investigative powers than a 
public authority. Generally, to maintain deterrence in the least costly way, it is necessary 
to fine-tune methods geared to produce necessary information. One way or the other, if 
there is a high information asymmetry, such as in Case scenario 2, the information must 
be introduced into the enforcement response. This is true for information concerning the 
nature of the trader as displayed in the hypothetical scenarios but also for information 
deficiencies concerning other characteristics of a case.
 Capture, frivolous lawsuits and error costs on the part of public authorities are 
the main reasons to favour involving a court element in mass procedures, or at least 
a separation of the public authority’s investigating and adjudicating body. While it is 
suggested in the design to disable mass cases involving ADR bodies in terms of public 
agencies, the ‘public law element’ needs to be exploited, and some cases and thus some 
type of involvement in mass cases guaranteed. The problem with error costs in mass 
proceedings is that they are spread over a group of individuals. Decisions must be 
challengeable, such as the taking of no action on behalf of a public agency if a case is 
reported be justified.
 Benefits can be seen in mass case decisions being taken on the part of an entity 
independent of the one that initiates the lawsuit and carries out the investigation. This is in 
line with the principles of separation of powers and prevention of capture. Adjudication 
could be undertaken by a civil court or by a different, independent public entity. Note 
that in terms of triggering a case at the public agency independently of whether it is done 
by one individual or a group or on an own motion, this entity is to filter cases according 
to social welfare criteria. This means that capture and any pursuing of individual interest 
different to that of society must be excluded. As established previously, the social costs 
of mass cases being dealt with by an ADR body exceed the benefits, which is why this 
option shall be excluded. The role for ADR is basically not given in these scenarios in 
terms of mass cases and ADR can likewise not be recommended for EUR 15 individual 
damage cases.
 Regarding the design of the representative group action that is being discussed here, 
an optimal design for any representative body is possible. Ingredients like the opt-in or 
opt-out nature of the action or mandatory procedures have to be taken into account.74 
People might want to free-ride in these cases but this can largely be remedied by the 
design. Furthermore, in terms of an association’s accountability, regulation can be 
considered. In practice, the financing issue of these entities – particularly as regards 
mass damage cases more than the other remedies – still needs to be improved in Europe.
Apart from aligning the combinations according to how the least-cost remedy for 
the information asymmetry – particularly in Case scenario 2 – can be accomplished, 
apparently the representatives carry out their individual CBA as well to decide where 
they can afford to bring a claim. Self-regulation can be a first step involving low costs 
here, and will be discussed below.
 The criminal court can only be an underlying threat of the enforcement system and 
not a regular addressee of mass claims.75 A case could be transferred to the criminal 
court if the investigative powers of the public agency do not suffice to adjudicate and 
74 Cf. Van den Bergh and Visscher, above n. 9, at 9.
75 In very exceptional cases (e.g. severe widespread harm in product safety cases), one can think of use 
being made of this. Expertentagung (2011): ‘Wilhelminenberg Gespräche’, Sozialministerium Österreich 
(Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs) ‚Catch me if you can/Geschäfte an der Grenze des Erlaubten’, as 
reported in ‘Die Presse’, Internet-Abzocke: Ruf nach kollektiver Rechtsdurchsetzung, (9 October 2011) 
<see http://diepresse.com/home/recht/rechtallgemein/699564/InternetAbzocke_Ruf-nach-kollektiver-
Rechtsdurchsetzung?_vl_backlink=/home/recht/index.do> accessed 23 February 2012. Collective actions 
at a criminal court are discussed in particular because they reduce the individual’s cost risks.
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thus to deter. Or, depending on the approach, the public agency could involve the police 
when acting as the prosecution. Mainly in cases where a wrongdoer does not comply 
with a private or administrative order, criminal law should enter the picture. In terms of 
providing the necessary information, any case brought to the criminal court is beneficial 
because, independent of many or few possibilities of the ‘claimant’ herself to generate 
information, it can be generated within the criminal process. Likewise, there is an 
advantage in that the accuracy of the procedure would keep error costs – which in mass 
scenarios are spread across everyone – low. In addition, any case involving a public 
authority as adjudicator or claimant has a high potential of generating information, 
although not as high as in a criminal investigation. Therefore, a consumer association 
could report a crime and the public prosecutor would take it from there at society’s cost. 
A very high potential of generating information prima facie can be guaranteed by a 
procedure involving both a public authority and a criminal court. Criminal law is meant 
to be only an underlying threat in optimal mixes for the type 2 trader. For a representative 
empowered to act as a prosecutor, the preparation of a case in the criminal court could 
be costly, due primarily to the high burden of proof that has to be satisfied.
 To a large extent, how serious the three issues – ‘capture, frivolous lawsuits, and 
principal agent’ – become depends on the remedy; how much there is at stake. The same 
is true for administrative costs: for example, proving the exact harm in a damages case 
and then distributing it is more costly than proving that some harm could occur in an 
injunctions case where no distribution is necessary afterwards; opt-in or opt-out and so 
on can be decisive, and ‘fining’ usually also excludes distribution of proceeds.
 When differentiating more specifically between the two case scenarios, it shall be 
set out how the optimal responses need to differ as to bona fide and mala fide traders. 
They are arguably often difficult to distinguish, and signalling strategies would have 
to be employed, which in practice do not work perfectly. While repeat offences are a 
comparatively clear sign that the company at stake is a mala fide trader, the company 
could also find ways of avoiding this signalling effect: for instance, by changing its 
name. The mala fide trader, the repeat offender, the one that already calculates a possible 
sanction in the fee for providing her service, needs to be deterred by enforcement going 
as far as criminal enforcement, possibly personal liability. The bona fide trader, however, 
must be treated differently. She is the one who places the inadvertently misleading 
advertisement, and does not intend any harm.
 The pivotal question becomes: how high can a sanction be in order to deter a profit-
maximiser from abusing the slow response – or the fact of no response – of the legal 
system and calculating with the existing sanctions? One is confronted with an ongoing 
violation, and a benefit can thus be found in terms of speed. A speedy proceeding such as 
an interim measure to stop something can be crucial, particularly in relation to scenario 
2, in which the trader allows for a fine that she hopes will be charged after she has made 
considerable profit. This is why in a legal system particular attention has to be paid 
to injunctions and to allowing interim measures. Encouragement can be undertaken 
by providing for any type of subsidies for injunction procedures, for example, in the 
form of a relief of court fees and the like. As regards frivolous lawsuits, there is also a 
particular danger in fast remedies being abused for anticompetitive purposes, resulting 
in a social loss. Particular attention thus has to be given to the incentives of competitors, 
as with any other remedy that has a high potential of harming a competitor’s business. 
Taken together, these are further reasons in favour of adding a court element to the 
procedure, meaning more accurate procedural safeguards. Likewise, some strategic use 
by consumers or consumer associations is possible, and these incentives need to be 
monitored.
 When thinking along these lines, it becomes evident that the ‘fastest reaction’ – 
such as the one that possibly leads to an advertisement never appearing on the market 
– is some kind of ex ante action. Therefore, the consideration is valid – if not in both 
cases, viz., bona and mala fide trader – that ex ante control can be of added value 
despite very high administrative costs: in the case of the mala fide trader, to protect 
the consumer, and in the case of the bona fide trader, to protect the trader herself from 
legal consequences. One wonders whether the only possibility to protect society from 
the violations of the mala fide traders is to bar their access to the advertising market 
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altogether. The prevention argument can be put forward if societal harm is extensive and 
should be prevented from occurring in the first place.76 In relation to certain products 
that can cause considerable societal harm, obligatory pre-clearance can be discussed. 
One might want to argue that this can be differentiated in terms of various sectors in 
advertising: for instance, those that have the potential to cause substantial harm and 
those that do not.77 This can potentially reduce administrative costs.
 The first addressee to do this from an efficiency perspective seems to be a public 
agency that not only has wide monitoring powers but also fines at its disposal in cases of 
non-compliance. Moreover, self-regulation can provide ways of clearing advertisements 
before they become public. In the real world, a differentiation can be suggested as to 
countries where self-regulation is successful and to others where it is not.78 While this 
can work for the bona fide traders in countries where self-regulation is strong, the 
mala fide traders will not respond to this system. Very harsh sanctions would lead to 
overdeterrence for even the bona fide traders. In general, cooperation between self-
regulation and a public authority can be envisaged, and – apart from legal considerations 
against censorship and the freedom of speech from an administrative costs point of view 
in terms of overall social welfare it is impossible to justify every advertisement being 
checked. Note that an indiscriminate application of preventive enforcement entails a 
danger of wasting society’s resources in preventing inefficient and efficient violations.79 
The voluntary aspect can lead to some signalling as to which trader represents which 
type, and would allow for a degree of targeted monitoring: for instance, in cooperation 
with other enforcers. This could contribute to social welfare.
 Rather than a pure deterrence approach, there is a strong prevention aspect in 
the design suggestions. Furthermore, the self-regulatory body is the cross-financing 
mechanism for other strong information asymmetry cases that need a more costly 
enforcement response. While self-regulation places some emphasis on ex ante action, 
the other bodies primarily work ex post. As to self-regulation, a sound connection with 
court proceedings, providing for ways to use the findings in courts, can be beneficial.
Concerning public authority interventions that are not seen as an underlying threat 
and complied with, the route to criminal law should be open. Cooperation between the 
police and public agencies as prosecutors can be warranted.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to illustrate design suggestions for efficient enforcement 
mixes for two hypothetical cases within misleading advertisement, namely a bona 
fide and a mala fide trader case scenario. Particular attention was paid to online trade/
advertising gaining in importance and potential current loopholes in the enforcement 
responses depending on the mechanism employed. The design suggestions were 
developed in enforcement models developed in a model world reflecting the common 
core of European procedural law.
 As a first result, the competitor’s natural incentives lead to a role for her. A competitor 
taking action allows to some degree for a consumer to free-ride and thus profit from the 
action – likewise for a societal benefit. There would be fewer information asymmetries 
due to the fact that competitors work in the same sector and there would presumably be 
less need of a ‘public law element’ to generate information.
 Secondly, though, as a competitor’s intervention is not certain, for instance in cartel-
like situations, an enforcement response triggered by the consumer side is also needed. 
Individuals will not sue individually for their small harm. Here the topic of mass 
litigation is important and different representatives come into play.
76 See Friehe and Tabbach, above n. 5, e.g. terrorism.
77 If all advertising is scrutinised, even accurate advertising must run the risk of a charge of being 
misleading. High burden on advertisers, see Jordan and Rubin, above n. 21, at 552.
78 Classical examples would be the Netherlands as a successful example; see M.G. Faure, A.I. Ogus 
and N.J. Philipsen, ‘Enforcement Practices for Breaches of Consumer Protection Legislation’, 20 Loyola 
Consumer Law Review 361, at 374 (2008).
79 See Friehe and Tabbach, above n. 5, at 4.
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 Thirdly and importantly, a differentiation between responses for bona and mala fide 
traders is crucial due to the different amount of benefits they calculate with – they need 
to be deterred by different means. As to the mala fide traders, the ‘public law element’ 
is essential. Depending on the nature of the trader, those enforcers who generate more 
information have to be favoured whenever it is in the social interest. It was set out how 
in particular a lack of information on the side of the consumer as regards the location 
of the trader (potentially aggravated by the rise of Internet trade that facilitates the 
possibility of traders hiding) is the reason for current failures in enforcement. Overall 
the factor ‘information generator’ (how, by whom, by which combination of actors) is 
a crucial topic especially for the mala fide trader case scenario where high information 
asymmetries are present. They have the potential to cause substantial societal harm. 
It was analysed which enforcement body can cure which information asymmetry and 
how mechanisms can be combined to cure each other’s weaknesses while paying 
attention to overall social welfare considerations. Aside of different potentials to create 
information concerning the nature of a trader, different enforcement mechanisms also 
vary concerning the amount of information they can generate as to other characteristics 
of the case.
 The intervention of mass litigation has to be optimally coordinated in terms of 
incentives via remedies. A definition must exist as to which players are empowered to 
bring lawsuits where, mitigating the problem of, for instance, frivolous lawsuits and 
aggravated agency and capture problems. In terms of where these actions are to be 
brought, a court element is favoured – mass ADR is considered not optimal from the 
overall welfare perspective. Individual ADR cases do not seem to be worthwhile either.
Self-regulatory solutions, if supported by the underlying threat of stronger enforcement 
responses, can be welfare enhancing and allow for some cross-financing. The information 
that is available within the market can be absorbed in this way. In relation to mala 
fide traders the ‘speed’ factor is crucial and ex ante actions are discussed in detail. On 
a voluntary basis pre-clearance can protect the bona fide trader and to some extent 
identify mala fide traders. In relation to some products that can cause very high societal 
harm, obligatory pre-clearance can potentially be effective.
 In terms of policy advice, it was evidently not expected that the solution would be as 
easy as suggesting one optimal mix of public and private enforcement in consumer law 
which would then be a one-size-fits-all solution that only would have to be transplanted 
into the countries that one desired. Apparently countries are no dark horses. Optimality 
is related to institutional settings. Countries have different attributes: for instance, some 
have strong private consumer associations while others rely on a public authority for 
law enforcement. The powers of these authorities can vary. Self-regulation is also not 
effective in every context. Some jurisdictions are more ready than others to assess 
damages within criminal law proceedings, and they rely on criminal law in general. A 
crucial factor in a country’s potential to change in a ‘low-cost way’, a welfare enhancing 
way, to an optimal solution is to consider the importance of path dependency. Path 
dependency positively explains why countries’ legal enforcement systems are shaped 
the way they are. While it is not argued that a country can only change along the lines 
of the path that it has taken, it certainly has to be considered when suggesting changes 
that the more they are innovative and alien to the system the more costs of change they 
potentially incur which has to be weighed against societal (long terms) benefits that can 
be derived from this. Therefore, the design suggestions are kept sufficiently broad and 
can be adapted specifically to countries. In that sense, it can be welcomed that national 
legislators are left with discretion as to the enforcement side of the UCP Directive.
 Note lastly that from the misleading advertising cases, some broader conclusions 
with minor variations are possible for other types of unfair commercial practices.
